John Burson headed home after completing a second tour of duty in Iraq at a combat support hospital.

Retired Lt. Col. John Burson, a 73-year-old physician, returned to Iraq in August for a second tour of duty treating wounded soldiers, as well as insurgents and civilians. Since his deployment, Burson, ChE 55, MS Met 63, PhD ChE 64, has been keeping in touch with an e-mail journal. He delivered his final installment in mid-October, on the day he was set to begin his journey home.

By John Burson

What began as a series of personal commentaries to my family and a few close friends has gone a little beyond that, and I thank all of you who have indulged me and read them. In putting these little essays together, I realize that the input of other eyes will be necessary to challenge my interpretations and correct my inevitable gaffes. I apologize to any of the principals whom I may have slandered or accused unfairly. I also thank my scholarly friends who have tried to keep me on the straight and narrow. At the North Avenue Trade School, we were not taught a lot of the finer points about prosaic writing; usually just getting the subject and predicate to agree was a major accomplishment.

When I volunteered for this second tour in Iraq, I had a very specific goal in mind. I wanted to validate my previous support for the war or to modify it as needed to fit the facts as I found them. I leave still somewhat uncertain as to the key events, who shaped them and how we could have avoided the mistakes.

The one thing I come home with that remains unchanged is my undying admiration, love and respect for the American fighting man and woman. They are at war when it seems no one else is. A young Marine was asked recently whether our country was at war, and he said with unusual wisdom, "We are at war. America is at the mall."

This war is different from most previous wars in that it is being fought by a professional volunteer military and thus affects only a small percentage of the American population. It is indeed a strange and lonely war, and no one seems to understand it as well as the GIs here on the ground. A common sentiment expressed by soldiers here is that the families at home often "just don't get it."

Here we live in air-conditioned quarters, eat good food, have hot showers and real beds, talk on cell phones and use the Internet. Yet at the same time, we experience the very real threat of a mortar or rocket attack or being blown up by an IED — it is all surreal. After being lulled to sleep by several weeks with no attacks, we had one a few miles down the road at Camp Victory. Two were killed and thirty wounded.

A major downside to the ease of contact with home is that the soldier stays very close to any problems that exist back home but is usually powerless to assist with any of them. Many soldiers are wary of returning home because of the challenges each faces in keeping Iraq in Iraq and home at home. Here there is no 9-to-5 routine, no weekend to break up the time, no errands, no bills, no distractions — just a series of strange and unpredictable events.

In most previous wars, the United States tried to keep units as heterogeneous and diverse as possible so that there was no concentration of people from small communities in any single unit; however, this is not usually the case here. The number of NG and Reserve units with a preponderance of their personnel coming from small towns increases the probability that multiple casualties will come from a single small community.

I believe the Iraqis are tired of this war and that fatigue factor is helping us by making recruitment harder for the insurgents. On the other hand, we have noted a definite increase in al-Qaida activity and are seeing more captures of non-Iraqis, most of whom are hard-core al-Qaida. These developments seem to show general increased stability among the Iraqis, especially the Sunnis. There now seems to be a genuine move on the part of some Sunni and Shiite tribes to rid themselves of the al-Qaida influence. The elephant in the room remains the Iraqi parliament.

We are now very quietly leveraging our lesser enemies, the Sunnis, against our even more dangerous enemies, al-Qaida. In the Sunni triangle, there are well over 100 different tribes and ethnic groups, and we have begun to learn how to deal effectively with them. We have turned much of their security over to them and are now arming and supporting them. Violence has plummeted since we made this move, and they seem to be doing an acceptable job of policing themselves.

Time will tell how lasting this fragile alliance is. In summary, we now seem to be pursuing a much more pragmatic course than early on, and I hear very little talk these days about establishing an American-type democracy in Iraq.

I am firmly convinced that we have a great Army but one that previously has been mostly trained for the "big war." Instead, we are facing a series of small wars like Iraq, Afghanistan and Kosovo. The leadership hierarchy in the Army has heretofore been largely focused on the big war with careers and higher-level promotions geared toward this scenario. The big war cannot be neglected, but we must work to find a balance that will enable us to fight counter-insurgencies as we have here in Iraq.

Until recently, the United States has been in danger of becoming the hated occupier of Iraq. Very few Iraqis have seen an American who was not pointing a weapon of some type at them. If the approach of befriending the Iraqi and living among them is not successful, then we may have run out of options and may need radically to draw down our forces into a few well-fortified camps, freeze all aid and construction and only venture out to help when we are asked. It seems unlikely that the kind of withdrawal that happened in Vietnam will ever happen here. With the oil reserves and the instability of all the surrounding states, it would appear that the United States is here to stay — perhaps for another 50 years as in Korea or the Philippines.

In summary, I believe our leadership at the Washington level has failed us badly in Iraq. Tactically, we have performed brilliantly. Strategically, we have been miserable. We have also discovered flaws in the way we train and fight, but we are correcting these on the fly, and we have no major concerns militarily if we continue to apply the lessons we have learned.

We now know how important it is to understand our enemy, and we understand that a raid that captures known terrorists or insurgents may be a hollow victory if we needlessly destroy property, humiliate other family members and alienate the local population from our efforts. Our focus is becoming more centered on the people and less so on the insurgent enemy. On this latter point, I have learned better to appreciate the need to treat even our detainees with professionalism, courtesy and respect (with a slightly hard edge at times).

I am cautiously optimistic that we may have turned a corner here. The problem is whether our country is willing to give the time necessary to carry this to a successful conclusion. I am less optimistic about this. Bringing stability and security to Iraq is a five- to 10-year operation at best.

"Groundhog Day" is drawing to a close and I have mixed feelings. I miss home and my family and friends, but I will also miss this place. It is hard to imagine learning to like a prison, but it has happened. I'm out of here today for BIAP, then Kuwait. At Ali al Salam in Kuwait, I'll wait for that freedom flight that only departs once a week. If I'm lucky, there will only be a day in Kuwait. If not, there will be eight days of lying around.

The iPod is all loaded for seven hours of listening, then maybe, just maybe, an adult beverage (none since July) during the layover in Ireland, then the US of A.